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THE SOCIAL AND MORAL COGNITION OF
GROUP AGENTS
Bertram F. Malle*
INTRODUCTION
To better understand the possibility, scope, and limits of
punishment for groups we must understand how humans
conceptualize group agents, interpret their actions, and make moral
judgments about them. In this article I therefore examine the
social-cognitive foundations for human perceptions of groups and
the moral evaluations of their conduct. Part I identifies the
conceptual framework within which people perceive, interpret, and
reason about individual agents. Part II examines whether people
apply the same framework to cognitions of group agents. Part III
introduces the psychological system that accomplishes people’s
moral judgments of individual agents. Part IV explores whether
people equally apply this system to moral judgments of group
agents. Finally, Part V discusses the limits of perceiving groups as
moral agents—limits that the perceiver may feel more painfully
than the agent.
I. SOCIAL COGNITION: THE CASE OF INDIVIDUALS
The ultimate goal of this article is to explore how groups can
be targets of moral cognition. Moral cognition, however, is deeply
embedded in social cognition, so my first concern is to identify
* Professor, Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences,
Brown University. M.A. (Philosophy and Linguistics), M.Sc. (Psychology),
University of Graz, Austria; Ph.D. (Psychology), Stanford University. I would
like to thank the organizers of the Trager Symposium for inspiring this article
and the editorial team at the Brooklyn Journal of Law and Policy for sharpening
its delivery.
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core constituents of social cognition—of both individuals and
groups—that provide a foundation for moral cognition.1 My focus
will be on three such constituents: judgments of intentionality,
behavior explanations, and ascriptions of mental states. These
phenomena will reveal a fascinating complexity of social cognition
that translates into a similar complexity of moral cognition. The
key question will be whether this complexity extends from
individual to group agents.
A. Fundamental Concepts: Agency and Intentionality
Humans perceive people, and interactions among them,
through a framework that conceptualizes behavior as
fundamentally linked with mental states. This framework,
variously called common-sense psychology, folk psychology, or
theory of mind consists of two parts: (a) systems that filter,
organize, and integrate certain stimulus inputs into such concepts
or categories as agent, intention, belief, and reason;2 and (b)
1

I should emphasize that social cognition encompasses a broader set of
concepts, capacities, and activities than I will investigate here. For reviews see
Bertram F. Malle, Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human
Social Cognition, in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS 225 (Ran Hassin et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Malle in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS]; Bertram F. Malle, The
Fundamental Tools, and Possibly Universals, of Social Cognition, in
HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES 267 (Richard
Sorrentino & Susumu Yamaguchi eds., 2008) [hereinafter Malle in HANDBOOK
OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION]. Among the capacities and processes I will set
aside we find face recognition, gaze following, mimicry, automatic empathy,
joint attention, imitation, simulation, and perspective taking. I will also say little
about the vast literature on stereotyping because its focus is on the perception of
individuals as group members, not the perception of groups. The actual socialpsychological literature on group perception will be well covered by Steve
Sherman and Elise Percy’s article, The Psychology of Collective Responsibility:
When and Why Collective Entities are Likely to be Held Responsible for the
Misdeeds of Individual Members, 18 J.L. & POL’Y forthcoming (2010).
2
See generally Roy D’Andrade, A Folk Model of the Mind, in CULTURAL
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 112 (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn
eds., 1987); Yoshihisa Kashima, Allison McIntyre & Paul Clifford, The
Category of the Mind: Folk Psychology of Belief, Desire, and Intention, 1 ASIAN
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 289 (1989); Alan M. Leslie, A Theory of Agency, in CAUSAL
COGNITION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DEBATE 121 (Dan Sperber, et al. eds.,
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assumptions about these categories and their relationships.3
This conceptual framework is distinct from the variety of
psychological processes that solve social-cognitive tasks—such as
action parsing, gaze following, simulation, or inference. These
processes have distinct evolutionary and developmental paths, and
they operate within the conceptual framework.4 Gaze following,
for example, exists in other primates, but its connection to
inferences of mental states such as seeing, appears to emerge only
in humans.5 The entire package of conceptual framework plus the
suite of psychological processes that operate within it make up the
larger phenomenon of human social cognition.6
The central categories of the folk theory of mind are arguably
agent, intentionality, and mind, and they are closely related to one
another.7 Agents are entities that can act intentionally; intentional
actions require a particular involvement of the mind; and only
agents have minds. This web of concepts is anchored in specific
perceptual-cognitive processes emerging in the first year of life.
Infants quickly identify agents from a few central cues, including
faces, self-propelled motion, and contingent interaction with the
perceiver.8 Having identified an agent, human perceivers are

1995); Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, The Folk Concept of Intentionality,
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Folk Concept of
Intentionality]; BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR:
FOLK EXPLANATIONS, MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION (MIT Press 2004)
[hereinafter HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR].
3
See generally JERRY A. FODOR, MODULARITY OF THE MIND (1983); Malle
in THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS, supra note 1; Adam Morton, Folk Psychology is not
a Predictive Device, 105 MIND 119 (1996); Henry M. Wellman & Jacqueline D.
Woolley, From Simple Desires to Ordinary Beliefs: The Early Development of
Everyday Psychology, 35 COGNITION 245 (1990).
4
HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
5
See Daniel J. Povinelli & Timothy J. Eddy, What Young Chimpanzees
Know About Seeing, 61 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV. 122 (1996).
6
For an introduction to this entire package, see generally Malle in
HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION, supra note 1.
7
See generally JAN SMEDSLUND, THE STRUCTURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMMON SENSE (1997).
8
Susan C. Johnson, The Recognition of Mentalistic Agents in Infancy, 4
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 22, 25 (2000); see generally David Premack, The
Infant’s Theory of Self-Propelled Objects, 36 COGNITION 1 (1990).
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sensitive to facial expression, gaze, and motion patterns that reveal
the agent’s specific intention underlying the observed behavior.9
Many linguists count the concepts of agent and intentionality
as fundamental to the way humans see and talk about the world,
and, indeed, linguistic forms of these concepts have been found
across all known languages.10 Developmental research, too, finds
the concept of intentional agent across all studied cultures.11
The concept of intentionality guides social cognition from
infancy on and, through development, reaches a remarkable
complexity. In adults, the concept encompasses five components
that refer to distinct mental states and capacities.12 For children,
acquiring such a complex concept is not an easy feat and is not
done in one trial. Instead, the child builds up the concept from
simple beginnings over many years of conceptual and social
development.13 During the first year of life, infants identify
intentional behavior by paying close attention to self-propelled
movement and especially object-directed movement such as

9

See generally Jodie A. Baird & Dare A. Baldwin, Making Sense of
Human Behavior: Action Parsing and Intentional Inference, in INTENTIONS AND
INTENTIONALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION 193 (Bertram F. Malle,
et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY]; Winand J.
Dittrich & S.E.G. Lea, Visual Perception of Intentional Motion, 23 PERCEPTION
253 (1994); Ann T. Phillips, Henry M. Wellman & Elizabeth S. Spelke, Infants’
Ability to Connect Gaze and Emotional Expression to Intentional Action, 85
COGNITION 53 (2002); Jeffrey M. Zacks, Shawn Kumar, Richard A. Abrams &
Ritesh Mehta, Using Movement and Intentions to Understand Human Activity,
112 COGNITION 201 (2009).
10
See generally JOAN BYBEE ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF GRAMMAR:
TENSE, ASPECT, AND MODALITY IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD (1994);
Talmy Givón, Cause and Control: On the Semantics of Interpersonal
Manipulation, 4 SYNTAX & SEMANTICS 59 (1975); ANNA WIERZBICKA,
SEMANTICS: PRIMES AND UNIVERSALS (1996).
11
See generally Henry M. Wellman & Joan G. Miller, Developing
Conceptions of Responsive Intentional Agents, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 27
(2006).
12
The five components are desire, belief, intention, awareness, and skill.
See infra Part I.B.
13
See generally Alison Gopnik & Andrew N. Meltzoff, The Child’s Theory
of Action, in WORDS, THOUGHTS, AND THEORIES 125 (1997); INTENTIONS AND
INTENTIONALITY, supra note 9.
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grasping or putting.14 At the end of the first year, they are able to
parse streams of behavior, at just the right junctures, into units that
correspond to initiated or completed intentional actions,15 properly
taking advantage of eye-gaze and verbal markers (e.g., “oops”).16
Through the second year, they refine their understanding of an
agent’s “object-directedness”17 into the first truly mental concept
of desire. Children recognize that another person can have desires
different from their own,18 and they infer an agent’s goals even
from incomplete action attempts.19 Over the next years, children
acquire the concepts of belief and intention—the latter of which is
cleanly differentiated from desire only after the age of five.20
Developmental change in the folk-psychological framework
thus occurs primarily as a differentiation of the intentionality
concept, from a simple behavioral understanding to an increasingly
rich mentalistic understanding. I now take a closer look at the
endpoint of this development—the fully-fledged concept of
14

See Amanda L. Woodward, Infants Selectively Encode the Goal Object
of an Actor’s Reach, 69 COGNITION 1 (1998).
15
See Dare A. Baldwin, Jodie A. Baird, Megan M. Saylor & M. Angela
Clark, Infants Parse Dynamic Action, 72 CHILD DEV. 708 (2001); Megan M.
Saylor et al., Infants’ On-line Segmentation of Dynamic Human Action, 8 J.
COGNITION & DEV. 113 (2007).
16
See Malinda Carpenter, Nameera Akhtar & Michael Tomasello,
Fourteen- Through 18-Month-Old Infants Differentially Imitate Intentional and
Accidental Actions, 21 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 315 (1998).
17
See Henry M. Wellman & Ann T. Phillips, Developing Intentional
Understandings, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY, supra note 9, at 139–40.
18
See Betty M. Repacholi & Alison Gopnik, Early Reasoning About
Desires: Evidence From 14 and 18-Month-Olds, 33 DEV. PSYCHOL. 12 (1997).
19
Andrew N. Meltzoff, Understanding the Intentions of Others: Reenactment of Intended Acts by 18-Month-Old Children, 31 DEV. PSYCHOL. 838,
842 (1995).
20
See Jodie A. Baird & Louis J. Moses, Do Preschoolers Appreciate That
Identical Actions May be Motivated by Different Intentions?, 2 J. COGNITION &
DEV. 413 (2001). For a review of the developmental path, see generally Janet
W. Astington, The Paradox of Intention: Assessing Children’s
Metarepresentational Understanding, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY,
supra note 9. For the distinction between desire and intention in adults, see
Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, The Distinction Between Desire and
Intention: A Folk-Conceptual Analysis, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY,
supra note 9, at 45.
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intentionality in adults.
B. Intentionality: Concept and Judgments
Over the centuries, philosophers have offered countless
analyses of the concept of intentionality. But whose concept is it?
How can we decide, for instance, whether intention is truly
different from desire? Malle and Knobe investigated empirically
what ordinary people’s concept of intentionality is.21 After all,
people use their own folk concept—not any philosopher’s
idealized model—to solve everyday interaction tasks and make
moral judgments.22 In a first study, participants read descriptions of
twenty behaviors and rated them for their intentionality. About one
half of the participants received no definition of intentionality
before they made their ratings; the other half did receive such a
definition (“it means that the person had a reason to do what she
did and that she chose to do so”). Agreement of intentionality
ratings across the twenty behaviors was high: on average, any two
people’s ratings correlated at r = .64, and any one person’s ratings
correlated at r = .80 with the remaining group. More important, the
experimenter-provided definition had no effect on agreement. It
appears that people share a folk concept of intentionality and
spontaneously use it to judge behaviors.
Given that there is a shared folk concept of intentionality, what
components does this concept have? Under what conditions do
people consider a behavior intentional? As a first pass, Malle and
Knobe asked people for explicit definitions of intentionality
(“When you say that somebody performed an action intentionally,
what does this mean?”). These definitions showed consensus,
revealing four main components: for an agent to perform a
behavior intentionally, the agent must have (a) a desire for an
outcome; (b) a belief that the behavior will lead to that outcome;
(c) an intention to perform the behavior; and (d) awareness of
21

See generally Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2.
See generally Bertram F. Malle & Sarah E. Nelson, Judging Mens Rea:
The Tension Between Folk Concepts and Legal Concepts of Intentionality, 21
BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 563 (2003); Bertram F. Malle, Intentionality, Morality and
Their Relationship in Human Judgment, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 61 (2006)
[hereinafter Judgments of Intentionality and Morality].
22
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fulfilling the intention while performing the behavior.
Malle and Knobe also postulated a fifth component of
intentionality: skill—or the ability to control and replicate the
behavior in question (rather than being lucky in somehow
managing to perform it). They presented participants with stories
about behaviors and experimentally varied whether evidence for
certain components was present (among them the agent’s skill).
They found that for difficult actions, people indeed look for
evidence of the agent’s skill at controlling the behavior.23
Malle and Knobe thus proposed a five-component model of the
folk concept of intentionality, displayed in Figure 1. According to
this folk concept, the direct cause of an intentional action is the
mental state of intention. For an intention to be ascribed, at a
minimum a desire (for an outcome) and a belief (about the actionoutcome link) must be present. For an action to be seen as
performed intentionally, however, skill and awareness have to be
present as well. Thus, people distinguish between intention as a
mental state and intentionality as a property of an action. This twolayer structure was supported in an additional experiment in which
belief and desire information was found to be necessary for
intention ascriptions and, given an intention ascription, skill and
awareness were found to be necessary for an intentionality
ascription.24 The five constituents of the folk concept of
intentionality—belief, desire, intention, skill, and awareness—can
be reliably found across many different languages and may be
universal conceptual primitives of the mind.25

23

This component was likely omitted from people’s explicit definitions
because people focused on social behaviors, for which skill is almost always
assumed, rather than artistic, athletic or otherwise difficult behaviors, for which
skill may not be as readily assumed.
24
Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2, at 109–11 (Study 3).
25
Wierzbicka, supra note 10, at 36–38. Wierzbicka’s list of such
conceptual primitives does not distinguish intentions from desires, but other
linguistic work provides evidence for the unique role of intentions. Bybee has
shown that, across countless and diverse languages, intending and the future
tense are tightly connected, something that we don’t see for desire or goal
concepts. See generally Bybee, supra note 10.
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Intention
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Intentionality
Figure 1. A model of the folk concept of intentionality.26

1. Two Forms of Intentionality Judgments
Even though the concept of intentionality consists of five
components and people are sensitive to the presence or absence of
each of these components, we should not expect people to
deliberate about these five components each time they judge a
behavior as intentional. They are likely to consider carefully each
of the components if uncertainty or the weight of the judgment
demands it, but we can expect people to use a more efficient path
to assess intentionality in everyday situations. This more efficient
path is configural, fast, and often unconscious; it develops earlier,
and evolved longer ago. The former, more deliberate path searches
for and weighs information; it is slower, often conscious, develops
later, and evolved more recently.27 Evidence for these two paths is
largely indirect, but it is convincing nonetheless.
Many animals can quickly recognize predator actions. These
naturally intentional actions look a certain way, and the prey makes
a configural judgment about such an attacking action.28 The animal
26

Figure 1 adapted from The Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2,
© Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., Inc., with permission.
27
These two paths may constitute two distinct processes (and neural
structures) or one process that is variably modulated by other processes (e.g., by
higher-order executive control). I have no commitment to one or the other
version, and there is no current evidence that could decide between the two.
28
Among goslings, a silhouette that moves in one direction in the sky,
resembling a hawk, is recognized as a threat whereas the same silhouette
moving in the opposite direction, resembling a duck, is ignored. This is a
configural judgment of the agent’s identity but is nonetheless a powerful
illustration of fast, configural judgments. See generally Nora Canty & James L.
Gould, The Hawk/Goose Experiment: Sources of Variability, 50 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 1091 (1995).
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is unlikely to make a literal distinction between intentional and
unintentional behavior, but a structure exists within the animal that
responds to certain configurations of movement that are intentional
actions and does not respond to others. We also know that apes
distinguish between behavior patterns that reveal something about
the agent’s intentions and behavior patterns that are apparently
accidental.29 Further, the detection of mirror neurons in monkeys
suggests that some of this capacity to recognize intentional action
comes from the immediate interconnection between the perception
of another’s action and the perceiver’s own motor program for this
action.30 Such mirror neurons fire both when the monkey sees
someone crack a nut and when the monkey cracks a nut itself.31
Thus, if the animal perceives a certain intentional behavior, then its
own triggered motor program will be intentional as well, which
provides a “tag” for the perceived behavior to be intentional. On
this account, perceivers can easily recognize intentional actions
that they themselves are capable of performing but not actions that
they themselves are not yet capable of performing. Research on 3to 6-month-old infants indeed shows this to be the case.32
Languages also code for intentionality, in lexicon or morphology,
and listeners can decode this feature in a split second. For example,
we immediately know the difference between a person saying “I
slept in” or “I overslept.” Finally, recent work in our lab has shown
that intentionality judgments of basic human actions are made very
fast and are largely independent of other judgments (such as of
goals, beliefs, and personality).33
29

See Josep Call & Michael Tomasello, Distinguishing Intentional From
Accidental Actions in Orangutans (Pongo Pygmaeus), Chimpanzees (Pan
Troglodytes), and Human Children (Homo Sapiens), 112 J. COMP. PSYCHOL.
192 (1998).
30
See generally Giacomo Rizzolatti & Laila Craighero, The Mirror-Neuron
System, 27 ANN. REV. NEUROSCI. 169 (2004).
31
This is true for other sensory modalities as well, such as hearing a nut
being cracked. See Evelyne Kohler et al., Hearing Sounds, Understanding
Actions: Action Representation in Mirror Neurons, 297 SCI. 846 (2002).
32
See Jessica A. Sommerville et al., Action Experience Alters 3-Month-Old
Infants’ Perception of Others’ Actions, 96 COGNITION B1 (2005).
33
Jess Holbrook, The Time Course of Social Perception: Inferences of
Intentionality, Goals, Beliefs, and Traits From Behavior (2006) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon) (on file with author). Bertram F.
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Evidence for the more deliberate path comes in part from
adults’ debates over ambiguous actions, such as in the jury box,
but also in daily life, such as when a person ponders whether a
colleague who didn’t invite him to the conference did so
intentionally or just failed to think of it. People seek evidence for
specific components if they are ambiguous or missing,34 which
implies a refined conceptual network and probably requires
language as well as school-age maturity. This we don’t find in
other primates, who can identify intentional action but, according
to extant evidence, do not have mentalistic concepts of desire,
belief, and intention.35 This is consistent with the general
assumption that chimpanzees are similar to 2-year-olds, who are at
the transition from a sophisticated behavioral to a mentalistic
understanding of intentional action.
Judgments of intentionality play a central role in many social
cognitive activities. The following section reviews one of the most
important ones: how people explain behavior. In particular, we
will see how people ascribe the mental states of beliefs and desires
to an agent in order to make sense of her behavior. The unique way
in which beliefs and desires are seen as the agent’s reasons
constitute a hallmark of the folk theory of mind and behavior.
Consequently, this hallmark will become a test case (in Part II of
this article) for how similar the social cognition of groups is to the
social cognition of individuals.

Malle & Jess Holbrook, Is There a Hierarchy of Social Inference? Evidence
From a New Experimental Paradigm (June 2008) (unpublished paper presented
at the Society of Philosophy & Psychology 34th Annual Meeting, Philadelphia,
PA) (on file with author).
34
Angela Laurita, The Concept of Intentionality Underlying People’s
Judgments of Criminal Behavior (2006) (unpublished Honor’s thesis, University
of Oregon) (on file with author). For a summary, see Judgments of Intentionality
and Morality, supra note 22, at 71–72.
35
See generally Derek C. Penn & Daniel J. Povinelli, On the Lack of
Evidence That Chimpanzees Possess Anything Remotely Resembling a ‘Theory
of Mind,’ 362 PHIL. TRANS. OF ROYAL SOC. BAR 731 (2007). For a more
optimistic view, see generally Josep Call & Michael Tomasello, Does the
Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years Later, 12 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
SCI. 187 (2008).
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C. Core Application of Intentionality: Behavior Explanations
The complex folk concept of intentional action is most clearly
revealed when we examine how people explain such actions. As
Heider noted, people’s explanations look quite different for
unintentional and intentional behaviors.36 They explain
unintentional behaviors by referring to “mechanical” causal factors
(e.g., emotions, traits, others’ behaviors, physical events), and we
may label these cause explanations. In such explanations, people
presuppose nothing but a straightforward cause-effect relation;
there is no role for notions of intention or awareness. For example,
“I almost failed my exams ‘cause I didn’t really prepare for them”
(not preparing caused failing) or “A friend cried on the phone
because she felt unloved” (feeling unloved caused crying).
In contrast, explanations of intentional behavior are far more
complex, involving assumptions of awareness, rationality, and
intentional control. In fact, people use three distinct “modes” of
explaining intentional behavior, and two are important for our
purposes here: reason explanations and causal history of reason
explanations.37 I now describe them in sufficient detail to explore
their role in explanations of group behaviors in Part II of this
article.38
36

FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 100
(Wiley 1958). Heider’s work has often been misinterpreted in the very literature
that followed his lead. See Bertram F. Malle & William Ickes, Fritz Heider:
Philosopher and Psychologist, in 4 PORTRAITS OF PIONEERS IN PSYCHOLOGY
193 (Gregory A. Kimble & Michael Wertheimer eds., 2000); See also generally
Bertram F. Malle, Fritz Heider’s Legacy: Celebrated Insights, Many of Them
Misunderstood, 39 SOC. PSYCHOL. 163 (2008).
37
The third, and relatively rare, mode of explaining intentional action
refers to factors that enabled the action to come about as it was intended. See
Bertram F. Malle et al., Conceptual Structure and Social Functions of Behavior
Explanations: Beyond Person–Situation Attributions, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 309 (2000) [hereinafter Conceptual Structure]; John McClure &
Denis Hilton, For You Can’t Always Get What You Want: When Preconditions
Are Better Explanations Than Goals, 36 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 223 (1997).
38
For more detailed analyses, see Bertram F. Malle, How People Explain
Behavior: A New Theoretical Framework, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
REV. 21 (1999) [hereinafter How People Explain Behavior]; see also Conceptual
Structure, supra note 37, at 310–15; HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR,
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1. Reason Explanations

Reason explanations are the most frequently used mode, and
they reflect the core of the intentionality concept—the reasoning
process that leads from belief and desire to an intention. This
process, according to people’s folk theory, occurs when an agent
decides to act in light of and on the grounds of those beliefs and
desires, which makes those beliefs and desires the reasons for
which she acted.
An agent decides to act in light of certain beliefs or desires if
the agent consciously considered them when deciding to act. This
“subjectivity” assumption39 is the first defining feature of reason
explanations: they are designed to capture the agent’s subjective
viewpoint, to reconstruct the agent’s actual beliefs and desires that
shaped her intention.
An agent decides to act on the grounds of certain beliefs or
desires if the agent saw them as reasonable grounds for deciding to
so act. This “rationality” assumption40 is the second defining
feature of reason explanations: they have to hang together so as to
offer justification for the reasonableness and comprehensibility of
the intention or action. For example, when an explainer claims,
“Anne invited Ben to dinner because he had fixed her car,” then
the explainer must presume that Anne actually considered Ben’s
fixing her car when deciding to invite him and saw his fixing her
car as reasonable grounds for inviting him.
2. Causal History of Reason (CHR) Explanations
Even though people explain most intentional behaviors by
reference to the agent’s reasons, they explain some of them by
pointing to factors that lay in the causal history of those reasons
but were not themselves reasons. These causal history of reason
(CHR) explanations can cite the agent’s unconscious mental states,

supra note 2, at ch. 4–5.
39
How People Explain Behavior, supra note 38, at 36; HOW THE MIND
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 92–93.
40
How People Explain Behavior, supra note 38, at 36–37; HOW THE MIND
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 93.
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personality, upbringing, culture, and the immediate context.41
Whereas reason explanations try to capture what the agent herself
considered and weighed when deciding to act, CHR explanations
take a step back and try to capture what led up to the agent’s
reasons in the first place. For example, when clarifying why Kim
didn’t vote, an explainer might say “She is lazy” or “Her whole
family is apolitical.” Both statements help explain Kim’s action,
but they do not pick out Kim’s subjective reasons for not voting.
Causal history of reason explanations explain an intentional action
by citing causal antecedents to the agent’s reasoning and her
decision to act, but there is no assumption that the agent actively or
rationally considered those antecedents in her reasoning process.
Hence, when an explainer states that “Kim didn’t vote because she
is lazy,” he does not imply that Kim reasoned: “I am lazy;
therefore I shouldn’t vote.”
In Part II of this article I examine the social cognition of groups
with a particular focus on the concept of intentional agency, the
explanation of action by reasons, and the types of mental states that
are (or are not) attributed to group agents.
II. SOCIAL COGNITION OF GROUP AGENTS
The Ventura County Community College District, the Ventura County
Fire Protection District, and the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department
intend to pool their resources
(Los Angeles Times)
Giant has offered a buyout to its highest-paid workers in an effort to
save on labor costs
(Washington Post)
Wimbledon simply did not know what had hit them and if this was
Arsenal’s reminder to Manchester United that they intend to fight to
retain their title to the last
(Irish Times)

41

How People Explain Behavior, supra note 38, at 32-35; HOW THE MIND
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at ch. 4, especially 102–09; Conceptual
Structure, supra note 37, at 311–15.
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Sea Bright officials initially opposed the sand-pumping program
because they thought their town would be inundated with out-oftowners
(Washington Post)

What should we make of such statements? At least at the
linguistic surface they are ascriptions of intentional actions,
intentions, knowledge, beliefs, and desires to group agents. Such
ascriptions can be found with ease in speech and print.42
But are they not just metaphors? A sharp critic of
“collectivism” writes, “The fact that we attribute intentional
qualities to groups does not imply that those groups have real
intentions. The intention we attribute to groups is metaphorical.”43
This criticism, however, is flawed in two respects. First, it makes
the empirical claim that “we” (people, I presume) attribute mental
states to groups metaphorically, but no empirical evidence is
offered for this claim.44 Second, the author apparently distinguishes
between the practice of (metaphorically) ascribing intentions (or
other mental states) to groups and some objective way in which
groups don’t literally have intentions. But what constitutes this
objective reality? If most humans see no problem in ascribing
intentions to groups, what is the scholar to say? “You are all
wrong!” Or perhaps “You don’t know what the concept of
42

Austen Clark, Beliefs and Desires Incorporated, 91 J. PHIL. 404, 404
(1994); Paul Bloom & Csaba Veres, The Perceived Intentionality of Groups, 71
COGNITION B1, B2 (1999); Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno & Hagop Sarkissian,
What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?, 1 REV. PHIL.
PSYCH. 225, 226 (2010).
43
Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 531, 545–46 (2003).
44
Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Robert Goldberg & Shaun Nichols, Folk
Psychology of Consciousness (unpublished manuscript under review)
(manuscript at n.9) available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~arico/FPC.pdf. Arico
and colleagues report evidence from pilot studies that people do not mean to be
“metaphorical” in their ascriptions of mind attribution. The researchers found
that ordinary people take statements such as “Some corporations want lower
taxes” to be literally true. On a scale from 1 (figuratively true) to 7 (literally
true), their ratings averaged 6.1. E-mail from Adam Arico, Dep’t of Phil., Univ.
of Arizona, to Bertram F. Malle, Professor of Psychol., Brown Univ. (June 19,
2010) (on file with author).
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intention means!” In actuality, it is the scholar who is confused
about the concept of intention. Given that there is a folk concept of
intention, scholarly work must determine when and why people
ascribe mental states to groups using that concept. If a scholar
would like to adopt a different concept of intention, based perhaps
on an alleged neural substrate, he or she would have to argue for it
but should better call it something else (e.g., neurointention).
People would continue to ascribe intentions to groups, and if they
learned what the scholar means by neurointention, they may
refrain from ascribing neurointentions to groups.
I therefore continue to assume that when people ascribe a
mental state to a group they literally ascribe that state to the group.
The question is just what this literal meaning of mental states
amounts to.
As with most folk concepts of the mind,45 people are, in
philosophers’ language, functionalists. They ascribe mental states
not by looking for a physical substrate but by integrating
perceptual cues (e.g., eyes, contingent behavior), categorical
assumptions (e.g., agents can act intentionally and have minds),
and context information. People envision “minds” in most animals,
gods, aliens, and computers if at least some of those conditions are
met: cues (e.g., biological motion triggering the expectation of
mental states); assumptions (e.g., that gods and aliens must be like
humans, just more so); and context (e.g., companies make
decisions and so are likely to deliberate). Because of the flexibility
of their concepts of agency, intentionality, and mentality, people
certainly have no difficulty ascribing minds to groups.46 However,
45

See generally Folk Concept of Intentionality, supra note 2; Andrew E.
Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The
Need to Study, Not Speculate About, People’s Folk Concept of Free Will, 1 REV.
PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 211 (2010); D’Andrade, supra note 2.
46
Some scholars reject the notion of group intentionality because
collectives don’t “exist” the way individuals do; they have no bodies, hence no
minds. See, eg., John Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?:
Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 18 J.L.
& POL’Y (forthcoming 2010). All we see are individuals who act on “the
group’s behalf.” But in this sense “I” don’t really act either; all we see is my arm
that moves the bottle and my legs that bring the arm close enough for it to move
the bottle. My arm and my leg would then act “on my behalf.” But individual
agents get things done in a variety of ways, with the help of a variety of organic
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they are not indiscriminate in those ascriptions. In fact, there is an
important distinction between two kinds of “group agents” that
people (and, increasingly, scholars) make.
A. Two Types of Groups
To adequately examine the social perception of group agents
we must distinguish between two types of groups:47 (a) aggregate
groups, in which the members of a group or collective all perform
the same action but do so independently (e.g., “Many New Yorkers
went to the Kandinsky retrospective at the Guggenheim”); and (b)
jointly acting groups, in which the members of a group act together
as a single agent (e.g., “The Tribeca Art Club went to the
Kandinsky retrospective at the Guggenheim”).
The label aggregate group48 captures well the fact that a
perceiver literally aggregates the members of this group into a
(linguistic) group category, such as “men,” “high school seniors,”
or “Irish peasants.” There is no assumption of interaction,
communication, or planning among members of aggregate groups.
Therefore, when we say, “With a sluggish labor market, college
graduates seriously consider post-secondary education to avert
unemployment,” we mean that each graduate considers this option
alone but that many of them do so. In this sense, an aggregate
group is not an agent but a collection of agents.
Jointly acting groups engage together in deliberation, decision,
planning, and (often) action. In this process, not only does each
individual member undergo certain mental states, but the group
decides and acts “as one.” Examples include a department faculty
deciding on a candidate’s promotion, a design team settling on a
product proposal, or a family planning a vacation. Here,
interaction, communication, and cognitive sharing among members
and inorganic aids, so we have to be equally tolerant of groups getting things
done in a variety of ways.
47
Matthew J. O’Laughlin & Bertram F. Malle, How People Explain
Actions Performed by Groups and Individuals, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 33, 38–39 (2002).
48
French proposed a similar label for this type of group: “aggregate
collectivities.” PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 5
(1984).
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are critically implied. Therefore, when we say, “With a sluggish
labor market, the board seriously considers furloughs to avert job
loss,” we mean that the board as a whole considers this option
(even if some individual board members may be quiet or may not
share the group’s concerns).
This second group type meets Pettit’s requirement of genuine
intentional group agency—namely, that a group agent must have
reasons and form intentions to act.49 As we have seen, the key
element in intentional agency is the belief-desire-intention (BDI)
reasoning process—that is, the transition from beliefs and desires
to intentions (and eventually actions). Normally these transitions
occur at the individual level (in a person’s mind), but for a group
agent they must occur at the group level.50 Thus, it is the group
that has desires and beliefs, and forms intentions. Rather than
allowing each group member to go through his or her individual
reasoning process and then somehow aggregating the output of
those processes into a collective intention to act, the group itself
must identify a desired goal, collate the relevant beliefs, check for
compatibility with other beliefs, desires, and already planned
actions, and then form a proper intention to rationally pursue the
goal. The individual members may not be unanimous in adopting
the beliefs, desires, and intention; but whatever procedure (e.g.,
majority voting) licenses the group to instantiate those states, that
procedure has to occur at each step of the reasoning process.
Figure 2 exemplifies the process of joint group reasoning.
Desire to hire
somebody now?

Group

✔

Individuals (5/6 majority)

Belief that P.P. is
the best candidate?

Belief that P.P. is
available?

✔

✔

(4/6 majority)

(4/6 majority)

Result: Group intention to offer the job to P.P.

Figure 2. The reasoning process from desires and beliefs to
intentions for a group-level agent
49

Philip Pettit, Collective Intentions, in INTENTION IN LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 241, 241–42 (Ngaire Naffine, Rosemary Owens, & John Williams
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY].
50
See generally MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS (1989).
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At each point of the deliberation when there is room for
disagreement, the group needs to say: “We believe, on the whole,
that X” or “We want, on the whole, that Y.” Specific procedures
thus have to be put in place that count as the group wanting,
believing, and intending something. Without such procedures, the
group agent never emerges (there are only a number of individuals
who try to figure out what others want and think), and any social
perceiver will also be unlikely to treat the group as a joint agent.
Consider a Dean who wants to know whether the department
endorses job candidate A or job candidate B. If the department
chair said, “The faculty like A better,” the Dean would retort, “Are
you reporting on a general preference or have you voted in a
faculty meeting?” That is, a mere distribution of individual
preferences cannot count as the group’s preference or the group’s
decision. Moreover, no member of jointly acting groups, not even
the “leader,” can form an intention for the group to do something;
it has to be the group (according to its procedures) that makes the
decisions.51
To illustrate the force and distinctness of such group-level
intentional action, Pettit52 discusses paradoxical situations in which
a group jointly forms an intention to act even though an
aggregation of individual reasoning (e.g., each faculty member
making a decision in his or her office alone) would have led to
rejecting the intention. This can occur when many group members
lacked just one premise of the reasoning process and therefore
wouldn’t individually adopt the intention. Returning to Figure 2, if
member 1 was lacking the desire, members 2 and 3 were missing
51

In larger groups and with more complex actions, the decision process
often requires distribution of partial subplans across individuals. Not all
members have all the relevant desires, beliefs, and knowledge for implementing
the overarching goal; even what constitutes the action may be distributed over
time and space. But the same is true for individuals. Moving to the U.S. was an
action I performed in 1990 (and not just at the moment the plane touched down
at San Francisco International Airport), and deciding and planning to do so
extended over almost two years and many locations. But this distribution does
not disqualify me from being the author of that planning, that action.
52
Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 49, at 244–47.
See also Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of their Own, in SOCIALIZING
METAPHYSICS 167, 170–72 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003).
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the first belief, and member 4 was missing the second belief, 4 of
the 6 members would have individually rejected the intention to
act. But in the case of genuine group reasoning, individuals
subsume their doubts at any given stage under the properly
licensed group reasons and therefore are bound to support the
group action.53
The subordination of individual group members to the group
intention (and action) is a key feature that distinguishes collective
agency from merely in-step multiples of individual actions, or a set
of individual intentions that are in agreement. Arnold, following
French,54 highlights the normative feature of decision rules that
groups adhere to (and that individual group members abide by).55
Once a department, board of directors, or Congress arrives at a
decision “in a manner consistent with the procedural norms,”56 the
department, board, or Congress really has an intention to act a
certain way even if not all members identify with the intention.
But when does subordination become noninvolvement? If most
members of a group don’t know and don’t care about the issue and
if the decision rules do not include a quorum, it becomes
questionable whether the voting among 10% of the group should
count as the intention of the whole group. Social perceivers may
doubt the very fabric of this group agent, criticize the decision
rules, and treat the intention not as one endorsed by the group but
by an elite within the group. The tyranny of a ruling elite should
not be taken as a nation’s will, and when a “State” declares war on
another, we should always ask who exactly had the aggressive
intent and what the constituents and boundaries of that group agent
53

Interestingly, many groups still vote on the last stage—the forming of the
group intention. They could omit this step if they strictly followed the group
reasoning process because the conclusion would logically follow from the
premises. But there are other reasons why such a vote is helpful (e.g.,
establishing mutual knowledge, mutual commitment, and a public record of the
intention).
54
See PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS (1995).
55
Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL.
279, 291 (2006).
56
These norms will need to foster, among other things, information
processing within the group that meets requirements of rationality and
reasoning. For a detailed argument, see Philip Pettit, Rationality, Reasoning and
Group Agency, 61 DIALECTICA 495 (2007).
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are.57
The following sections introduce two test cases for the
hypothesis that the social cognition of groups is fundamentally
similar, though not identical, to the social cognition of individuals.
The first case documents how people explain behaviors performed
by groups compared with behaviors performed by individuals. The
second case examines ascriptions of various mental states,
particularly ascriptions of two basic classes—propositional
attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions) and phenomenal states
(e.g., feelings, emotions, sensations).
B. Behavior Explanations
There is no better domain in which to demonstrate people’s
commitment to group-level agency than behavior explanations.
The logic is straightforward. If people consider group agents to act
intentionally they should explain those actions with reasons—
which is, as we have seen earlier, the dominant mode by which
people explain individual intentional behavior.58 The use of reason
explanations for group agents would thus provide evidence for
both the application of intentionality and the use of mental state
(belief and desire) ascriptions in making sense of group agent
behavior.
1. Do People Use Reason Explanations When Explaining Groups’
Behaviors?
O’Laughlin and Malle devised three experiments in which
ordinary people explained a variety of behaviors, some performed
by individuals, some performed by groups.59 These explanations
57

For a discussion, see Larry May, State Aggression, Collective Liability,
and Individual Mens Rea, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 309, 314–17 (2006). For a
distinction between larger, amorphous groups, such as the U.S. citizenry as a
whole, and more tightly organized and epistemically connected groups, such as
the U.S. Supreme Court, a Board of Directors, or a university department, see J.
ANGELO CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT 162–63 (3d ed., 2006).
58
See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
59
O’Laughlin & Malle, supra note 47, at 36. The participants were asked
to explain, in writing, a series of behaviors in the context of a fictitious
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were classified into reasons and causal history of reason (CHR)
explanations using the F.Ex coding scheme.60 For ease of
presentation I report relative percentages of reasons.
The stimuli were created such that each behavior could be
presented as having been performed by either an individual or a
group agent (e.g., “Why did Nina use drugs?” vs. “Why did the
High School Seniors use drugs?”).
In Study 1, actions performed by individuals elicited 71%
reasons whereas actions performed by groups elicited 56%
reasons. These results suggested two conclusions: first, that people
do use reasons (i.e., mental states in light of which an agent
decides to act) when explaining a group’s action; but second, that
they do so less than when they explain a group agent’s action.61 All
plural agents in Study 1 were aggregate groups. We therefore
interpreted the findings by noting that members of aggregate
groups often have distinct reasons for acting the same way (e.g.,
the various reasons that “young people” may have for not voting).
Citing all of those reasons would be cumbersome, so a social
perceiver might do well by offering a CHR factor as a
parsimonious (if general) explanation, pointing to a background
that triggered the array of different reasons.
In Study 2, O’Laughlin and Malle made use of the distinction
between aggregate groups and jointly acting groups to further
explore both the general finding that group behaviors elicit a
substantial rate of reason explanations and the more specific
finding that this rate of reasons is lower than the one found in
explanations of individual behavior. The authors’ hypothesis was
conversation with a friend. The instructions emphasized that participants should
formulate their explanations based on how they might actually respond within
the context of such a conversation; “highly technical, or exam-like answers were
discouraged.” [In each] “conversation excerpt,” the friend always elicited an
explanation from the participant by asking why the agent performed the
behavior at issue and participants answered the question by writing on three
blank lines. Id.
60
BERTRAM F. MALLE, F.Ex: CODING SCHEME FOR PEOPLE’S FOLK
EXPLANATIONS OF BEHAVIOR (2010), available at http://research.clps.brown.
edu/SocCogSci/CodingSchemes.html.
61
This reduction in reason explanations (and the corresponding increase in
CHR explanations) for group agents was statistically reliable and explained 18%
of the variance in explanations.
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as follows. Jointly acting groups are united by their reasoning from
beliefs and desires to intentions (see Fig. 2 above). A parsimonious
(and informative) explanation for their behavior could therefore
refer to those reasons, so the rate of reason explanations for jointly
acting group behaviors should be similar to the rate for individual
behaviors, and both should be higher than the rate for aggregate
group behaviors. Indeed, the average of the jointly acting groups’
reason rate and the individual agents’ reason rate was 76% whereas
the aggregate groups’ reason rate was 62%.62 However, one
surprising finding emerged: the reason rate for jointly acting
groups (81%) was even greater than the rate for individual groups
(71%). This pattern was replicated in a follow-up study, which
showed both the drop of reason explanations for aggregate group
behaviors (46%) relative to the average of individual and jointly
acting group behaviors (76%) and the even greater rate of reason
explanations for jointly acting group behaviors (86%) than for
individual behaviors (66%).
2. The Hyperagent Hypothesis
The reported studies document that people have no difficulties
ascribing mental states qua reasons to whole groups, whether
aggregate or jointly acting. Thus, social perceivers appear to use
the same conceptual framework (their folk theory of mind and
behavior) for explaining group behaviors as they do for explaining
individual behaviors, and the claim that people credit “plural
subjects” with minds can hardly be doubted.
But the reported findings raise the possibility that people see
jointly acting groups as even more “agentic,” even more driven by
subjective and rational reasons, than they see individuals. I call this
the hyperagent hypothesis. Why might groups acquire such a
hyperagent status?
First, a jointly acting group’s reasoning process may be
particularly salient or easily imaginable because joint deliberation
and joint decision making are the key features people use to
identify this type of group. Second, a jointly formed group
62

This difference was statistically reliable and explained 13% of the
variance in explanations.
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intention has presumably overcome the different interests of
various group members and might therefore be seen as stronger
than an individual’s intention. In fact, the subordination of
individual group members to the group’s intention signals the
unifying force that the group exerts on individuals. Third, the high
degree of organization and procedure in jointly acting groups may
be interpreted as a forceful determination to act.
These inferred features of salient deliberation, strength of
intention, and organized action readiness can be exploited when
social perceivers describe jointly acting groups as menacing and
powerful. Reason explanations will therefore be particularly likely
in propaganda against jointly acting groups.63 For example, in
justifying the impending attack on Poland in 1939, Hitler
reportedly characterized the Eastern neighbor in the following
way:
In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the
secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us
harm.64
Similarly, an excerpt from an anti-homosexual document
alleges the tight organization of the “homosexual movement”:
The homosexual movement is extremely well organised,
and has made powerful allies and friends who lobby on its
behalf . . . .
....
In recent months, the organised homosexual movement has
been lobbying vociferously, and sometimes violently, for a
reduction in the age of consent.65
In legal contexts, too, a prosecutor may want to emphasize
coordination (“conspiracy”) among individual defendants
committing a series of crimes. In a powerful example from history,
63

For a more detailed exposition of this topic, see HOW THE MIND
EXPLAINS BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at ch. 8, especially section 8.4.
64
1 OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS
CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 391 (1946), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Nazi_Vol-I.pdf.
65
Alexander Baron, Baron’s Guide to “Gay” Sex: A Primer for Children
and Young People, THE WEBSITE OF ALEXANDER BARON, http://www.infotext
manuscripts.org/barons_guide_1.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
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the Allied prosecutors in the Nürnberg indictments treated the
principal group of twenty-four Nazi war criminals as
conspirators—as one jointly acting group
In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi
conspirators prepared to seize totalitarian control over
Germany to assure that no effective resistance against them
could arise within Germany itself.66
....
Implementing their “master race” policy, the conspirators
joined in a program of relentless persecution of the Jews,
designed to exterminate them.67
The writers liberally use linguistic expressions of planning
(“aims and purposes,” “prepared to seize,” “program”) and of
reasons and goals (“in order to . . .,” “designed to”), underscoring
the motivation, resolution, and intentionality of the collective
atrocities.
C. Mental State Ascriptions
I now turn to the second test case for the hypothesis that the
social cognition of groups is fundamentally similar to the social
cognition of individuals. I examine what kinds of mental states
people ascribe to groups and whether these states differ in kind
from the ones people ascribe to individuals.
We know from the previous section that people explain group
behaviors with reasons. Reasons are typically desires and beliefs—
what philosophers of mind call propositional attitudes. But what
about other mental states? Do people feel comfortable ascribing
such states as fear, love, hearing, and tasting to a group’s mind?
Note that in this case, ascriptions to aggregate groups (as argued
earlier) are not much of an issue. For example, “The men felt
embarrassed when they lost the game” can be easily interpreted as
saying that each man felt embarrassed; no group mind felt
embarrassed. Likewise, “The people standing in line turned
66

2 INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 33 (1947), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_major-war-criminals.html.
67
Id. at 35.
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frustrated and impatient because only one counter was open” says
only that each of the people turned frustrated and impatient. By
contrast, jointly acting groups are candidates for ascriptions of
such affective states: Did the BP corporation feel embarrassed over
its handling of the Gulf oil spill in 2010? And was the U.S.
government angry at BP?
1. Different Mental States?
In classic philosophy of mind work, we find a distinction
between two main classes of mental states: propositional states
(e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions) and nonpropositional states (e.g.,
pain, feeling sad, smelling fresh coffee).68 Propositional states are
understood by many to be “computational”—that is, they could in
principle be implemented in other media besides the human brain,
such as in computers or aliens. The other, nonpropositional class of
states has often been characterized as phenomenal—as having a
certain experiential quality. Ascriptions of phenomenal states to
groups may be more restrictive; they may require a certain
brain/body or a unitary mind for implementation.
Robbins and Jack proposed that people take a phenomenal
stance to certain other creatures, and certainly to other human
beings.69 That means they regard them as a locus of experience and
ascribe to them a variety of phenomenal states (emotions, moods,
pains, visual sensations, etc.). This stance is contrasted with the
intentional stance,70 according to which people ascribe to others a
variety of propositional states (e.g., belief, desire, intention). One
key feature of Robbins and Jack’s proposal is that the phenomenal
stance comes with a consideration of the other creature as having
moral standing. Ascribing to another the capacity for distress
comes with a desire to prevent such distress and, in particular, to
shield the other from potential harm. Thus, the phenomenal stance

68

For an overview of this distinction, see generally David Pitt, Mental
Representation, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (last updated July 21, 2008), http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation.
69
Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack, The Phenomenal Stance, 127 PHIL.
STUD. 59, 69–70 (2006).
70
See generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1987).
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is “morally compelling.”71 I will return to this potential link
between ascriptions of phenomenal states and considerations of
moral standing.
What evidence is there for the claim that ordinary people make
a distinction between propositional and phenomenal states? Gray,
Gray, and Wegner asked participants to ascribe a variety of mental
states and capacities to different agents.72 The pattern of these
ascriptions suggested a two-dimensional space: One axis, which
the authors labeled “Experience,” was constituted primarily by
phenomenal states (e.g., hunger, fear, pain, pleasure); the other
axis, which the authors labeled “Agency,” was constituted
primarily by states of higher cognition (e.g., self-restraint, moral
judgment, memory, and planning). However, very few
propositional states were included in the study, and those that were
(desire, planning) did not cluster together. The results also allow
for alternative interpretations. The items defining the first axis can
be understood as capturing unintentional states, and the items
defining the second axis can be understood as capturing intentional
states. Likewise, the first axis can be considered a dimension of
affect and the second a dimension of cognition.
2. Different Mental States For Groups?
Knobe and Prinz conducted a series of studies that explore both
the distinction between propositional and phenomenal states and

71

Robbins & Jack, supra note 69, at 70.
Heather M. Gray, Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, Dimensions of Mind
Perception, 315 SCIENCE 619, 619 (2007). The states included, among others,
desire, embarrassment, hunger, memory, and morality; the agents included,
among others, a robot, a frog, a human infant, adult humans, and god. Each
participant evaluated just one state and indicated for all possible pairs of agents
whether one agent had more of that state than the other agent (a procedure that
facilitates between-agent differentiation rather than between-state
differentiation). The comparative ratings were then aggregated for each agent
and averaged across people who considered the same state. This resulted in
mean ratings for thirteen agents on eighteen states. The data analysis was
unconventional because a principal components analysis (PCA) was run on this
matrix of thirteen rows and eighteen columns, even though a common
requirement of PCA is to ensure 5–10 times as many rows as columns.
72
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the distinction between individual and group agents.73 The results
suggested that people are comfortable ascribing propositional
states (e.g., decide, want, intend, believe, know) to group agents,74
but that they are reluctant to ascribe phenomenal states to them (a
sudden urge, great joy, vividly imagining, getting depressed,
feeling excruciating pain).75 The authors favored a strong
interpretation of these findings, according to which people
consider groups to uniquely lack the capacity for “phenomenal
consciousness.” The evidence does not strongly support this
interpretation, however.
In Knobe and Prinz’s studies, even though people did not deem
natural such statements as “Acme Corp. is feeling upset,” they
found it perfectly natural to say “Acme Corp. is upset about the
court’s recent ruling.”76 It would be a rather unusual conception of
phenomenal states if one could be in those states but not feel them.
Fortunately, however, people’s conception does not appear to be
that unusual. Sytsma and Machery were unable to replicate the
difference between “feeling upset” and “is upset” (and similarly
for “regret”).77 More important, for both formulations people on
average endorsed the midpoint between “sounds clearly weird” and
“sounds clearly natural”—not exactly evidence for a refusal to
ascribe phenomenal states to groups. Arico, too, failed to replicate
the importance of the “feeling” verb, and his participants similarly
rated the naturalness of phenomenal group states at just above the
midpoint of the scale.78 These findings support only the contention
73

See Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About Consciousness:
Experimental Studies, 7 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67 (2008).
74
The group agents in point were Microsoft and Acme Corp. Id. at 74–75.
75
On a scale of 1–7, where 1 meant “sounds weird” and 7 meant “sounds
natural,” the propositional states received average ratings between 5 and 7, and
the phenomenal states received average ratings between 2 and 5. Id. at 75.
76
Knobe & Prinz, supra note 73, at 77–78. Note that the compared pairs
differ not only in the presence of the “feeling” verb but also in the provision of
actual content (being upset about something in particular). Id. Arico did not find
any difference in naturalness ratings for either of the two differing features.
Adam Arico, Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects, 1 REV.
PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 371, 379 (2010) [hereinafter Arico, Folk Psychology].
77
Justin M. Sytsma & Edouard Machery, How to Study Folk Intuitions
About Phenomenal Consciousness, 22 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 21, 28–30 (2009).
78
Arico, Folk Psychology, supra note 76, at 379. Arico did find a modest
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that people are unsure about whether phenomenal states can be
ascribed to groups, not that they reject them outright or find them
conceptually incoherent.
3. Drawing the Right Conclusions
The current state of evidence is thus highly mixed. On the one
hand, one might conclude that people treat group agents quite
similarly to individual agents, all the way to the ascription of many
(if not all) phenomenal states. There appears to be a subtle
difference in comfort when ascribing phenomenal states to
individuals or groups, but that difference is not well understood at
this point. On the other hand, one might conclude that there is
really something remarkable about the lesser comfort people have
when ascribing phenomenal states to groups. It tells us something
about the uniqueness of group agents, even if this uniqueness has
fluid boundaries.
It comes down to the question of how we should explain the
small but perhaps consistent comfort difference. One hypothesis is
that it results from the partial semantic fit of mental state terms
with the physical substrate of groups. For example, people have no
trouble with group agents wanting or desiring something but are
more reluctant to ascribe a sudden urge to them. This may be due
to specific semantic components being unmet (e.g., urges have
physiological components whereas desires do not), and the overall
semantic fit is therefore somewhat reduced when particular verbs
are ascribed to groups. But if we learned that groups cannot do
certain things because they lack a (single) body,79 should we
consider this to be a disappointing insight?
Such disappointment may be premature. Even though people
provide intermediate judgments of “naturalness” for verbal
difference in perceived naturalness of group vs. individual mind ascriptions (4.5
vs. 5.6 on the familiar 1–7 scale). But a variety of nonconceptual factors may
account for such a modest difference (e.g., frequency of encountering one kind
of descriptions). Id. at 380.
79
Sytsma and Machery indeed show that people are highly reluctant to
ascribe to groups such behavioral attributes as “being murdered,” “napping,” or
“having insomnia,” all requiring a body. Sytsma & Machery, supra note 77, at
26.
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descriptions of phenomenal states, they still fail to spontaneously
and frequently attribute such states to group agents. Knobe and
Prinz claimed, on the basis of a Google search, that virtually no
instances exist of phrases such as “Microsoft feels angry” or
“depressed” or “scared,” whereas thousands of instances exist of
phrases such as “Microsoft decides” or “wants” or “hopes.”80 If
people are indeed rarely exposed to verbal ascriptions of
phenomenal states to group agents, the mere mental association
between such states and groups will be weak, and people may be
unlikely to search for or infer such states in groups. I call this the
hypothesis of a reluctant inferential stance.
4. The Reluctant Inferential Stance
If people are reluctant to infer a family of affective and
phenomenal states to groups, an intriguing possibility emerges: a
group agent who rarely has worries and does not feel pain, who
cannot be intimidated and has no regrets, will be seen as a
perfectly self-interested, calculating agent. Even if individual
members of a group may experience all these states, they are
dispensable and exchangeable—the group’s structure and
organization can still maintain its calm rationality. Such an image
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Knobe & Prinz, supra note 73, at 73–74. The authors don’t provide
details about their search procedure, so the representativeness of their test is
difficult to evaluate. I conducted a very brief search with the word pairs
“Microsoft decide[]” as well as “Microsoft angry” and “Microsoft happy.”
Already the first results page of each search contained hits. Two sources
ascribed anger to Microsoft: Trent Nouveau, Microsoft Angry at Google Over
Vulnerability Disclosure, TG DAILY (June 11, 2010), http://www.tgdaily.com/
security-features/50181-microsoft-angry-at-google-over-vulnerabilitydisclosure; Microsoft Gets Angry at Yahoo-Google Tie Up, THE INQUIRER (July
28, 2010), http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/blog-post/1725295/microsoftangry-yahoo-google-tie. Three sources ascribed happiness to Microsoft,
including Roy Schestowitz, Microsoft Happy About Apple’s Invocation of
Software Patents Against GNU/Linux, TECHRIGHTS (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://techrights.org/2010/03/16/mobile-linux-victory. However, occurrences of
“decide” were clearly more frequent overall in my search (about 8/10 per page).
So people are not conceptually resistant to ascribing phenomenal states to group
agents, but it is safe to say that people are far less frequently exposed to verbal
ascriptions of group agents’ phenomenal states.
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would further contribute to the notion of jointly acting groups
being hyperagents—agents that display more commitment, exert
more power, and ultimately pose a greater threat than any
individual agent could.
Such an image would have a further consequence. Agents who
do not feel worry, regret, or pain are unlikely to be responsive to
social censoring—to warnings, threats, and punishment. Such
censoring is of course part and parcel of community members’
moral treatment of one another. Therefore, we must ask: How do
people morally treat a group agent? Are group agents proper
targets of moral expectations? Moral evaluation? And moral
punishment? These questions will occupy us in Part III of this
article. First I consider people’s moral judgment of individual
agents.
III. MORAL JUDGMENT OF INDIVIDUAL AGENTS
A. Morality Is Embedded in Folk Psychology
When people make moral judgments about an agent, they
evaluate the agent’s behavior by considering (a) norms that the
behavior may have violated and (b) what was in the agent’s mind
before, while, and even after performing the behavior. The latter
considerations are a direct reflection of people’s folk theory of
mind (described in Part I of this article). We can thus say that this
folk theory lies at the heart of moral judgment.81
Humans do not normally make moral judgments about
earthquakes or hurricanes. What makes moral judgments genuinely
moral is that they are directed at agents who are presumed to be
capable of following socially shared standards of conduct. Hence,
the agency concept is a crucial ingredient of moral judgments.
Specifically, blame is assigned in consideration of an agent’s
principled capacity to reason about various paths of action and the
capacity to intentionally pursue one such path. And even when
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I will focus on blame judgments, which can be considered the
paradigmatic moral judgment. See generally Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E.
Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology, 52
INQUIRY 449 (2009).
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harm occurs unintentionally, if the person could have and should
have chosen a harm-avoiding alternate path but didn’t, blame
applies. Hence, the concept of intentionality is a crucial ingredient
of blame judgments.82 My colleagues and I have developed a
working model of blame that prominently features the concept of
intentionality and also integrates a number of well-supported
features of blame.83
B. A Step Model of Blame84
People can be blamed for outcomes or behaviors. However,
even in the case of outcomes, the agent is ultimately blamed for the
behavior of causing, allowing, or failing to prevent the outcome.
Thus, to streamline the presentation, I designate as the first step in
the blame process the perceiver’s detection of a norm-violating
behavior.85

82

Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious
Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm,
17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 1083 (2006); Guglielmo, Monroe & Malle, supra note
81, at 451; see generally ANTHONY KENNY, The History of Intention in Ethics,
in THE ANATOMY OF THE SOUL: HISTORICAL ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND 129 (1973).
83
Guglielmo, Monroe & Malle, supra note 81, at 450–52.
84
This is a “step” model of blame because several information processing
elements build on each other and will often be temporally ordered. However, as
with all complex information processes, backward loops, premature processing,
and omissions can occur. Moreover, the specific level of awareness that
perceivers exhibit at each of these steps may vary. At least some of the time
some of the steps will be conscious.
85
When detection is direct perception of behavior (“This is wrong!” “This
is forbidden!”), almost no cognitive work is needed; instead, we may see the
operation of moral “intuitions” and “moral grammar rules.” See references to
Haidt and to Mikhail, infra note 86. Such detection may come with automatic
negative affect (e.g., anger, disgust) that may influence subsequent processing
steps. Claims about such influence (and especially of undue bias) have been
frequent but often rely on highly indirect evidence—researchers almost never
distinguish the early norm-breach affect from the later blame-accompanying
affect.
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Detection
(Behavior or outcome)

Intentionality:
Did the agent bring about
the event intentionally?

No

Yes
Justification:
What were the agent’s
reasons for bringing about
the event?

Obligation:
Was the agent obligated
to prevent the event?

No

Low
Blame

Yes
Degrees of Blame
Capacity: Could the agent
prevent the event (skill,
foreknowledge, opportunity)?
Yes

No

Figure 3. Step model of ordinary assessments of blame.86

86

Guglielmo, Monroe & Malle, supra note 81, at 450–51.
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The detection step may or may not be considered a genuine
moral judgment yet,87 but it certainly is a necessary requirement of
a genuine blame judgment. During the detection phase the
perceiver focuses on evaluating the “badness” of the behavior;
during the judgment phase the perceiver focuses on the
blameworthiness of the agent. Put simply, people don’t blame
behaviors, they blame agents.
Blaming an agent requires assessing the agent’s mental states
involved in the behavior. The key assessment here is the familiar
question of whether the behavior was intentional or unintentional,
which constitutes the next step in the model. This step is pivotal
because it bifurcates the perceiver’s further information processing
into two paths. In the case of intentional behavior (the left path in
Fig. 3), the perceiver considers the agent’s particular reasons to
act. In the case of unintentional behavior (the right path in Fig. 3),
the perceiver considers the combination of the agent’s obligation
and capacity to prevent the event in question.
The reasons that the perceiver considers along the left path are
the agent’s beliefs and desires that lead to her intention to act,
indicating that once people determine that an agent intentionally
breached a norm they want to know why she acted this way.88
These reasons will strongly increase or decrease blame by way of
justification. An agent who hurt someone intentionally may have
had justified reasons (e.g., a dentist trying to extract a child’s
unhealthy tooth) and will be blamed less than the one who had
unjustified reasons (e.g., a schoolboy trying to provoke a fight).
What reasons provide justification is of course a manner of
community norms.
87

Many treatments of moral judgment do not clearly distinguish the normviolating phase from the blaming phase. Those that do vary in how much affect
they postulate is involved in the early phase. Haidt argues there is much affect,
Cushman as well as Mikhail argue that cognitive processes dominate. See Fiery
Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and
Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353, 375–78 (2008);
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 817–19 (2001); John
Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the Future, 11
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143, 143 (2007).
88
See supra, Part I.C.1 on reason explanations.
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The information that perceivers consider along the right path is
quite different. When people regard the agent as having acted
unintentionally, they examine whether the agent should have
prevented the event (obligation)89 and could have prevented it
(capacity).90 Both of these considerations are tied to the
intentionality concept. Social communities impose obligations on
individuals because they expect them to intentionally act (or at
least intend to act) in accordance with these obligations. If the
agent lacks the requisite capacities to meet the obligations—
cognitive capacities such as knowledge or reasoning and
noncognitive capacities such as skill or opportunity—little to no
blame will apply. If the agent has the necessary capacities and is
subject to the obligation, then a failure to prevent the negative
event will trigger substantial blame. This blame will vary by how
much the failure is considered imprudent, negligent, or reckless
behavior, or possibly even an intentional, deliberate breach of
one’s obligation.91
This model has a fair amount of overlap with legal decision
making in history and current practice—and this should not be too
surprising given that the law codifies some basic human features of
89

For related discussion of these two elements, see The Significance of
Intentionality, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY, supra note 9, at 19–23.
Obligation varies primarily with role, such as position within a hierarchy—see
generally V. Lee Hamilton, Chains of Command: Responsibility Attribution in
Hierarchies, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 118 (1986)—and type of relationship
(e.g., stranger vs. friend). Jonathan Haidt, & Jonathan Baron, Social Roles and
the Moral Judgment of Acts and Omissions, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 201,
202–04 (1996).
90
This roughly corresponds to Weiner’s concept of controllability, which
in his model is the critical precursor to responsibility judgments, which in turn
foster blame (or sympathy). See generally BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF
RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONDUCT (1995).
91
An intentional breach of one’s obligation is itself a norm violation and
will be evaluated along the left arm of the step model: the perceiver now
considers the agent’s justified or unjustified reasons for the breach. Perceivers
may thus initially form a moral judgment about an agent’s unintentional causing
of a negative outcome and end with a moral judgment about the agent’s
intentional failure to prevent the outcome. For further discussion, see Steve
Guglielmo & Bertram Malle, Can Unintended Side-Effects be Intentional?
Resolving a Controversy over Intentionality and Morality, 36 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. (forthcoming 2010).
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moral judgment. For example, murder is typically defined as
intentional killing, which requires both intentional “body
movements” and the mental state of “intent to kill.”92 More
generally, criminal responsibility is often defined as the pairing of
a harmful act and the “corresponding mental state or intent.”93 But
the overlap ends when the courts and the literatures of philosophy
and law engage in disputes about the exact meaning of intention.94
These disputes are often fanned by individual scholars’ intuitions
about what intentionality is and they reflect historical and
geographical variation in restricting or expanding the meaning of
relevant terms (e.g., intentionally, willingly, and knowingly).95 By
contrast, the advantage of an empirical-based model of moral
judgment such as the step model is that the terms don’t have to be
debated repeatedly, as they are fixed by ordinary people’s folk
concepts of intentionality, intention, and the like.
The main difference between the science of moral judgment
and legal scholarship is that science typically focuses on a
descriptive mission—clarifying the concepts and processes that
guide people’s behavior—whereas the law focuses on a
reformative mission (changing people’s thinking and behavior).
Many legal and philosophical discussions, however, conflate the
two missions by using ordinary words (e.g., intention) when they
propose to reform people’s thinking or attempt to sharpen the
meaning of terms in legal texts. When using ordinary words, the
reformed or sharpened meaning will often clash with the words’
ordinary meanings (at least for those words that stand for a deeply
ingrained folk concept, such as intention). Far better would be to
introduce terms of art that, by steering clear of familiar folk
concepts, may be more successful in shifting people’s thinking or
92

Stephen J. Morse, Craziness and Criminal Responsibility, 17 BEHAV.
SCI. & LAW 147, 148 (1999).
93
Alan R. Felthous, Introduction to Mental Illness and Criminal
Responsibility, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 143, 143 (1999).
94
See, e.g., R. ANTHONY DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL
LIABILITY (1990); KENNY, supra note 82, at 129; Nicola Lacey, A Clear
Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?, 56 THE MOD. L. REV. 621 (1993).
95
See generally Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of
Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences,
49 HOW. L.J. 1 (2005); Malle & Nelson, supra note 22, at 569–70.
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attitudes.96
Because I follow a descriptive mission here, the critical
question now is this: Having in place a model of how people make
blame judgments of individual agents, what do people do when
they face a group agent’s immoral behavior?
IV. MORAL JUDGMENT OF GROUP AGENTS
There is broad agreement in the literature that a group’s
capacity for intentional action is a prerequisite for the group’s
status as a moral agent. As Isaacs put it, “showing that collectives
are capable of intentional action is necessary for showing that they
are appropriate objects of praise and blame.”97 The capacity to
exemplify intentionality, mental states, and reason-based choice
(rationality) is also what French postulates as central in rendering a
corporation a “moral agent.”98 He argues that corporations are
moral agents because they are capable of intentional action. These
are claims about the metaphysics of corporations; however, they
are in accordance with ordinary social perception. As we have seen
in Part II, Section B, people regard as agents groups who act
intentionally and have reasons for their actions.
But the status of corporations and other group agents as
intentional agents makes them only eligible for moral evaluation.
What does such evaluation look like in detail? Does it work the
same way as for the moral evaluation of individuals? We need not
automatically assume that collective moral judgment operates the
same way, but if there is no evidence to the contrary, we may
continue to accept it as a working hypothesis. This equal-operation
hypothesis is also strengthened by a basic theoretical argument. If
people’s powerful folk psychology is unflappably applied to group
agents, and if moral judgment is deeply drawing on folk
psychology, then moral judgment, too, should be applied to group
96

Malle & Nelson, supra note 22, at 565.
Tracy Isaacs, Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention,
20 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 59, 62 (2006).
98
See Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL.
Q. 207 (1979). A revision of the postulate of corporations as moral agents is
described in Peter A. French, Integrity, Intentions, and Corporations, 34 AM.
BUS. L.J. 141 (1996).
97
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agents.
To test the equal-operation hypothesis in more detail, we need
to examine the elements of the step model of blame and examine
whether judgments of group action could be shuttled through a
cognitive apparatus with those elements.
A. Applying the Step Model of Blame to Group Agents
A brief look into any newspaper reveals that people easily and
often detect norm-violating group behaviors—performed, for
example, by teams, gangs, corporations, parties, governments, or
nations. The specific norms for groups may differ from those for
individuals, but for the norms that do apply, moral breaches are
certainly recognized and formulated.
People also have no trouble distinguishing between intentional
and unintentional group behavior.99 Unintentional collective
behaviors may be less frequent than intentional ones,100 but acts of
negligence (by definition unintentional) are commonplace in
accusations of objectionable corporate behavior.
Following the left path of arriving at blame in the step model,
we know that people ascribe reasons to group agents, so we can
expect people to consider reasons as possible blame moderators for
norm-violating actions. A corporation or government will certainly
offer such justifying reasons in order to mitigate potential blame
for its actions.
Following the right path of arriving at blame, the existence of
norms for group agents implies that there are obligations for group
agents as well, for being subject to a norm means being obligated
to conform to it, and if there is a norm of prevention (especially of
99

It might seem that in Pettit’s model, Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 49, no unintentional behavior can be a genuine group
action because the very decision process from reasons to intention are the
prerequisites of his model of collective action. However, a group decision
process may have unintended consequences that one can ascribe to the group,
which is then an unintentional behavior performed by the group. Once the group
has demonstrated, through undergoing their appropriate decision process, that it
is a genuine group agent, it can perform both intentional and unintentional
behaviors.
100
O’Laughlin & Malle, supra note 47, at 34.
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harm), the obligation to prevent will fully apply.
Furthermore, groups arguably vary in their capacities to
prevent possible negative outcomes. They vary in their knowledge
of certain facts as well as in skills and opportunities to execute
certain intentions (to bring about or prevent outcomes). Ascriptions
of knowledge (or lack thereof) to groups have been documented in
Part II, Sections B and C, and variations in skills and opportunities
are surely uncontroversial.
Thus we arrive, without making contentious assumptions, at a
picture according to which group agents can be blamed through the
operation of the same cognitive apparatus through which
individuals are blamed. We have no direct evidence that social
perceivers form group blame following only these steps, but there
are at least no apparent obstacles for them to do so.
B. Ongoing Research
In a recent experiment, Dillon and Malle gathered some
evidence for people’s judgments of intentionality and blame in
response to group agent behavior.101 University student participants
considered a number of actions performed by individuals and
groups and made a variety of judgments about those actions: “Was
the behavior intentional?” “Did you detect what the agent was
thinking?” “Does the agent deserve praise or blame?” The key
measurements were participants’ rates of affirmative responses
(indicating an inference of intentionality, thinking, or blame,
respectively) and the response latency for those responses.
Importantly, all actions were formulated in three ways: as
performed by an individual, by an aggregate (e.g., inner city kids
across the nation; students in the psychology class), and by a
jointly acting group (e.g., the Latin Student Organization; the
senior design team).102 The results suggested that both individual
and group agents elicited similar and differentiated rates of
inference (i.e., intentionality was inferred more frequently than
101

Kyle Dillon & Bertram F. Malle, Ease and Speed of Social Inferences
from Individual and Group Behaviors (Sept. 2010) (unpublished data, Brown
University) (on file with author).
102
Each participant saw actions performed by all three groups, but never
the three versions of the same action.
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thinking, which was inferred more frequently than blame) and that
speed of inferences were also remarkably similar across agents
(with intentionality the fastest). The only noteworthy difference
due to agent type emerged in the absolute frequency of
intentionality inferences, where individual and jointly acting group
agents elicited more affirmations of intentionality than did
aggregate groups. However, when people did make those
inferences, they accessed them equally fast.
These results are only preliminary until we demonstrate
consistency across stimulus properties and task demands.
However, they do provide an indication that it is quite easy and
natural for people to make mental inferences and moral judgments
about group actions.
V. THE MORAL LIFE OF GROUP AGENTS, LTD.
A. Problems for Blaming Groups
In light of the current evidence, we can be confident that
people assign blame to group agents and do so with essentially the
same psychological apparatus that they engage when blaming
individual agents. But blame has two faces: the cognitive, on
which I have focused, and the social, which so far I have set aside.
This social face of blame consists of verbal or physical acts that
express the perceiver’s moral judgment and are typically directed
at the target agent, presumably for purposes of behavior regulation.
Punishment may follow, and expressed blame is one kind of social
punishment.103
But here is the first problem: How well can social perceivers
express blame toward group agents? People do not actually
encounter nations, governments, or corporations; even teams or
committees are rarely seen face to face. In modern life, people can
write letters to a group agent, sue them, or publicly denounce them.
But these expressions will be rare, limited in scope, and come with
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A more intense social punishment is exclusion. For a review, see
generally Rorbert Kurzban & Mark R. Leary, Evolutionary Origins of
Stigmatization: The Functions of Social Exclusion, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187
(2001).
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little assurance that the addressee actually notices the blame.
The second problem is this: If blame is rarely expressed and
even more rarely heard, regulation of group agents’ behavior runs
idle. Of course, a social perceiver can vote against a government or
refuse to buy from a company; but here she alters her own actions
more than the group agent’s actions. Only when individual social
perceivers aggregate or join together can social blame and
punishment become an effective regulator. Thus, it often takes a
group agent to fight or put in its place another group agent.
A third problem was presented in Part II, Section C: If group
agents lack affective mental states, they will also be unlikely to
feel guilt, regret, or remorse.104 As a result, groups will have fewer
moral scruples, which further blocks social regulation as well as
deterrence. If groups are rational, solely cognitive agents, potential
punishment becomes part of the utility calculation for their actions;
anticipated guilt or regret lies outside these calculations.
Fortunately there are boundaries to this bleak picture. As long
as individual group members feel moral emotions and fear
punishment, their influence on other members can alter group
action. In this case, the locus of moral emotions is not the group
agent but the individual who alters the decision making of the
group agent. In the frame of Pettit’s model, individual members’
moral emotions can sway votes and lead to jointly adopted or
rejected group reasons and intentions.105 Such a process requires an
accessible and transparent structure and a manageable group size
so that individuals can express their emotions and thereby
influence others’ preferences and beliefs. Then the group can
decide to forgo certain opportunities because they are morally
objectionable. The group itself never instantiates guilt or raises a
moral objection, but individuals do.
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Strictly speaking we cannot currently determine whether group agents
actually lack such feelings or are only perceived to lack them. For simplicity I
will continue to use the objective formulation.
105
See Pettit in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 49.
Within individuals, the power of moral emotions is not radically different: the
emotions sway the person’s decision making by changing desire and beliefs,
making costs salient, or prospects unattractive. That the person feels the
emotions ensures that those changes are executed.
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B. Blaming Individual Group Members
If blaming and punishing group agents is difficult or
ineffective, people have the option of punishing individual group
members.106 However, matters do not necessarily become easier
here as individual group members may be viewed as differentially
responsible for a group’s undesirable action and should therefore
be differentially punished.107 But what guides such differentiation?
The step model of blame may track the relevant factors.
What will matter first is the degree to which the individual was
causally contributing to the group action. After the team’s loss,
substitute players are not subject to the same sanctions as starting
players. The individual’s motivation or justification for committing
the act will be assessed as well. Was he under pressure from the
group or intrinsically motivated to achieve the specific outcome?
Did she vote with the group majority or against it when the group
action was adopted?
The obligation of the individual in preventing the act will also
be questioned: Is the citizen obliged to prevent the nation’s war? Is
the worker obliged to stop the company’s discrimination?
Capacities, too, will be of importance, both cognitive ones
(how much did the person know?) and physical ones (how much
ability did he have to actually avert the group action?).
A final element is the level of identification or distancing that
the group member displayed. If group membership is a choice (less
so for nations than teams), then maintaining group membership
counts as an endorsement of the group’s collective actions.
Attempts to protest, to distance oneself from those actions, even if
these attempts were squelched, will count in the individual’s favor.
Conversely, happily going along with the group action when
distancing was possible (but endorsement brought personal
benefits) will count against the individual. A classic case of such
complex assessments is the involvement of soldiers and citizens in
the Holocaust. How much did the German and Austrian (and
106

See Tracy Isaacs, Individual Responsibility for Collective Wrongs, in
BRINGING POWER TO JUSTICE?: THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 167 (Joanna Harrington et al. eds., 2006).
107
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Polish and French . . .) citizenry know about the Nazi command’s
genocide? What could they have reasonably done to prevent it?
What signs of endorsement or distancing can be documented?
These are exceptionally difficult questions in their own right,
but they are made even more difficult because people’s moral
judgment apparatus has a single agent node and cannot easily
handle multiple agents in intertwinement. Individuals are relatively
easy to judge; perhaps group agents, too. But individuals as
members of a group agent are not.
CONCLUSION
A considerable number of group agents are perceived as
powerful, sometimes threatening, perhaps morally unregulated.
Why? Humans have no trouble reasoning about the actions and
minds of groups and have the desire to blame and punish them
when they act immorally. But the ability and effectiveness to
blame and punish groups is limited, particularly for
institutionalized group agents (e.g., governments, corporations,
committees). Moreover, such group agents rarely show the
common emotions of fear, guilt, and remorse. All that fans
people’s perceptions of group agents as threatening, powerful, and
morally unalterable. It also causes deep frustration, which in turn
may explain people’s growing distaste for corporations and the
substantial damage awards in legal cases that punish large
companies. Perhaps it also explains the political see-saw in most
democratic countries, where the ideological tide switches in every
other election, right after the last group agent was blamed for all
the society’s ills.
Thus, the modern world presents the human mind with group
agents that trigger all the familiar social-cognitive and moral
responses but that leave little room to act on those responses.
Perhaps the law can provide some room for appropriate action—by
codifying norms, obligations, and punishment not just for
individuals but also for groups. In doing so, however, the law must
heed the concepts and criteria by which ordinary people recognize
group agents and judge their moral conduct.

